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INTRODUCTION
One primary goal of criminal law is to produce justice.1  In
order to obtain justice, the citizens of a republic delegate power
to representatives, who then create a system of rules and pun-
ishment that ensure a predictable and fair scheme of justice.
Although the citizens willingly give over this power to receive
† J.D. candidate, Developmental Psychology and Law, Cornell University;
Publishing Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 102.  I would like to thank Susan
Green Pado and the whole Cornell Law Review community, especially Will Pellet,
Julia Bensur, Yevgeniy Temchenko, and Nicole Greenstein.  I am grateful to Ste-
phen Garvey for his thoughtful guidance throughout the writing process.  I am
also thankful for the mentorship of Stephen Ceci and Valerie Hans.  Thank you to
my parents, Jeffrey Royer and RuthAnn Royer, for everything.
1 See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 1149, 1153 (1997).
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the benefits of a structured society, this exchange does not
mean that the democratic government must function un-
checked by its people.2  Within the criminal justice system, the
jury serves as one protection against government overreach
and as a safeguard to ensure that true justice is done.3  In
order to produce that justice, sometimes the jury must aban-
don the strict rules of the legal system.4  This behavior is re-
ferred to as jury nullification5 and generally occurs when jurors
vote to acquit a defendant despite believing that the defendant
is guilty under the law and that the prosecution has proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.6  Because jury deliberations
are secret, jurors have the inescapable power to nullify.  Never-
theless, in Sparf v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
there is no right to jury nullification and, thus, a judge does not
have to instruct the jury about their ability to judge the law.7
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sparf, there has
been a lack of judicial support for jury nullification.8  State
legislators have sporadically attempted to codify the right, but
after facing opposition, many of those legislators abandoned
their attempts.9  This process was recently exemplified in New
Hampshire, where the legislature passed a bill intending to give
juries permission to judge both the facts and the law of crimi-
nal cases.10  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire resisted
the attempt and held that the law was too broadly worded to
2 See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579, 621–22
(2014) (examining nullification and the rule of law, and specifically discussing
how jury nullification is a challenge to the notion that law must have “wholesale
deference” because instead “the power of governance . . . must flow from the
citizen to the government”).
3 See id. at 586–87; see also Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification as a Defense
Strategy, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 6–7 (1995) (arguing that an originalist reading
of the Constitution suggests nullification was an intended purpose for the crimi-
nal jury).
4 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1153 (“To achieve one of law’s ends—justice— R
we must sometimes abandon law’s means, such as rule application.”).
5 Jury nullification is sometimes referred to as “jury independence.”  For the
sake of consistency, this Note will use the term “jury nullification,” which is more
prevalent in the literature.  In addition, while jury nullification does occur in civil
cases, this Note will focus on the criminal jury only.
6 See Aaron McKnight, Comment, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the
Demands of Law and Justice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1104–05 (2014) (summariz-
ing the history of nullification and the arguments for and against it).
7 See 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895).
8 See infra subpart II.D.
9 See M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legisla-
tive Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101, 1115–21 (1993) (discussing a
variety of nullification-related bills introduced in state legislatures); see also infra
Part II (explaining the various ways jury nullification could become codified).
10 See infra subpart II.D.
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give defendants the right to a formal jury nullification
defense.11
In addition to a lack of judicial support for codification,
some supporters of jury nullification have also argued against
codification of jury nullification.  Those supporters argue that
legally legitimizing jury nullification would erase an important
component of the process: the jurors’ desire to disobey the law
due solely to a moral duty to produce justice.12  This argument
interprets unsanctioned jury nullification as a form of private
and protected civil disobedience.  In order for an act like jury
nullification to be considered true civil disobedience, some
scholars argue that the desire to disregard the law must arise
from a place of moral outrage.13  If jurors are instead instructed
by an agent of the government about their freedom to ignore
the law, the motivation to nullify loses its moral purity and
legitimacy.
This Note will propose that, despite a lack of support from
the judiciary and civil disobedients, state and local legislators
should have a strong democratic interest in restoring the right
to jury nullification.  The codification of jury nullification will
give legitimacy to the criminal trial process and uphold the
longstanding democratic function of the jury.  The Note will
begin in Part I with a discussion of why jury nullification is
important and should be an encouraged part of the criminal
justice system.  This discussion will include an analysis of the
reasons why jurors typically nullify.  In Part II, this Note will
discuss previous methods of formally integrating jury nullifica-
tion into the criminal trial system and why those methods have
largely been unsuccessful.  Then, as a case study of legislative
intent, this Note will examine New Hampshire’s recent at-
tempts to codify the right to jury nullification and the New
Hampshire Supreme Court’s aversion to doing so in more de-
tail.  This discussion will demonstrate why explicit legislative
interest is imperative if jury nullification will ever be legiti-
mized.  In Part III, this Note will suggest that there should be a
legislative duty to protect the right to jury nullification and
thus the democratic function of the jury.  This Part will also
introduce an innovative way for legislators to protect the right
to jury nullification through a system of nullification pleas.
11 See State v. Paul, 104 A.3d 1058, 1061 (N.H. 2014) (interpreting the 2012
statute).
12 See George C. Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: “Jury Nullifica-
tion” and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1303–04 (1974).
13 See id.
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I
THE IMPORTANCE OF JURY NULLIFICATION
The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right
to an “impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.”14  The Founding Fathers believed
that the jury provided an important function for the criminal
justice system: the system entrusts the jury to introduce the
conscience of the community into the courtroom in order to
prevent government oppression.15  As a part of this function,
early juries were generally entrusted with the right to “judge”
and “determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.”16
Thus, jury nullification was a natural function of the founding-
era jury.  When deciding a case, the jurors could judge both the
facts of the case and whether the law should be applied in the
way that the government suggested.  As such, sometimes fol-
lowing the law was not part of the juror’s legal obligation.17
Instead, the founders recognized that blind obedience to the
law as written could prevent justice.  If laws were left un-
checked by the people, the laws could fail to acknowledge the
world as it actually existed and could burden rather than bene-
fit the community; therefore, the jury had the moral obligation
to fulfill a correcting function when the law was inappropri-
ate.18  Jurors were entrusted to forgive lawbreaking when the
law violated community standards.19  After all, citizens would
be in the best position to assess whether the application of the
law was functional within the community itself.20
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15 See Carroll, supra note 2, at 590. R
16 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (opinion of Jay, J.); see Conrad,
supra note 3, at 5 (“John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay R
and others spoke out on the topic of jury independence, and . . . agreed that the
role of the jury consisted of judging both law and fact.”).
17 See Christie, supra note 12, at 1299–300. R
18 See Carroll, supra note 2, at 622 (“[E]ven from the moment of their crea- R
tion, [laws] may never have adequately accounted for or accommodated the lives
of the citizens they govern.”).
19 See David C. Brody & Craig Rivera, Examining the Dougherty “All-Knowing
Assumption”: Do Jurors Know About Their Jury Nullification Power?, 33 CRIM. L.
BULL. 151, 153 (1997).
20 It is important to note here that founding-era jurors “were selected from the
elite white male property-owning classes” who often played a role in the creation of
the law themselves. CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOC-
TRINE 154 (2014).  Thus, the government likely viewed those jurors as more capa-
ble of judging the law than they would the current-day jury who is made up of the
defendant’s “peers.”  However, while the modern-day jury is likely less familiar
with the system of laws itself, today’s jury is more representative of the commu-
nity that the laws are enforced against.  As a result, today’s jury has a better
understanding of the impact those laws have on the community.
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This function places jury nullification close to the sphere of
civil disobedience.  Civil disobedients break laws in an attempt
to show that “the principles of justice governing cooperation
amongst free and equal persons have not been respected by
policymakers.”21  While jurors are not breaking the law them-
selves,22 they are facilitating the violation of a law by another
party—the defendant.  Typically, for an act to qualify as civil
disobedience, the act must be: 1) illegal, 2) performed publicly,
3) non-violent, 4) conscientiously performed, and 5) performed
with a willingness to suffer the penalty for its performance.23
While jury nullification is parallel to civil disobedience, jury
nullification does not meet all of these criteria.  To begin, jury
nullification is typically not a forward-looking act by either the
jury or the defendant.24  Nullification preserves the defendant’s
lawbreaking, but that violation is rarely designed to change the
law itself or benefit society as a whole.  Furthermore, nullifica-
tion occurs within the black box of the jury, and lawmakers
rarely know for certain whether the jury has purposefully nulli-
fied after judging the law.  This makes it difficult for legislators
to be responsive to their communities, because the legislators
may not know the true reason why a jury acquitted a defen-
dant.  Thus, it is unlikely that nullification (as it exists tradi-
tionally) would result in widespread societal change, even if the
jury (and therefore the community) believes the law is unjust.
Furthermore, jurors who participate in nullification do not
have to face a penalty for their actions.  Jury nullification is not
technically illegal, and jurors are rarely charged with perjury.25
The secretive nature of the jury deliberation process bars any
real form of judicial review of jury decisions.  In addition, the
21 Kimberley Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHI-
LOSOPHY § 1.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2016/entries/civil-disobedience [https://perma.cc/4VQJ-NPPL].
22 Jury nullification itself is not illegal, but in some cases nullification may
involve violating the juror’s oath and some nullifiers may also commit perjury.
See McKnight, supra note 6, at 1111–12. R
23 Floyd Berry & Tammy Molina-Moore, Identifying Obstacles to Real Justice:
An Ethical Critique of Race-Based Jury Nullification, 13 J. INTERCULTURAL DISCI-
PLINES 88, 93 (2013).  Additional qualifications for civil disobedience have also
been suggested: 6) committed to the goal of bringing about a change in a law or
policy, 7) not performed for the benefit of one person or a particular group of
people, and 8) accompanied by a reasonable possibility of success in bringing
about the change. Id.
24 See generally Brownlee, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that civil disobedience R
“typically has both forward-looking and backward-looking aims” to “convey . . .
disavowal . . . but also to draw public attention to this particular issue and
thereby to instigate a change in law or policy”).
25 See McKnight, supra note 6, at 1111–12. R
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Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution from appealing a
jury’s acquittal decision, so even if the judge believes nullifica-
tion has occurred, there is no remedy for the government.26
Thus, jurors who nullify and their respective defendants rarely
face any legal consequences, which removes the “purity” or
“selflessness” of real civil disobedience.27  Without any conse-
quences, jury nullification may involve less integrity than other
acts of conscientious lawbreaking wherein the lawbreakers
willingly suffer penalties for their actions.  Juries can, in the-
ory, mercurially acquit defendants which would create a sys-
tem of anarchy instead of a system of democracy.
Nevertheless, jury nullification is still an important parallel
to civil disobedience; jury nullification is an intentional act by
citizens to protest the application of the law.  Ideally, in its
purest form, nullification occurs as a desire to instill change
within the system, at least for one particular defendant.  It is a
non-violent way for citizens to communicate that they disap-
prove of a law (or at least how the law is being applied).  The
jury system allows citizens to be vocal in a realm that would
otherwise be dominated by the government’s perspective of jus-
tice.  Ideally, jury nullification communicates to policymakers
that the law is not consistent with community standards.
Thus, nullification is a sanctioned version of civil disobedience,
and its function as a democratic check on governmental power
is the reason that jury nullification is integral to the American
scheme of justice.
A. Disapproval of Jury Nullification
In the middle of the nineteenth century, jury nullification
lost favor within the United States.  In 1843, New Hampshire
was the first state to decide that juries should not judge the
law.28  Instead, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that
juries have a strict duty to follow the laws as interpreted and
26 See Conrad, supra note 3, at 1–2. R
27 See Brownlee, supra note 21, at § 1.2; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY R
OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 265 (1979) (explaining that some scholars
view purity of motive and submission to punishment as necessary prerequisites
for an act to qualify as civil disobedience). But see McKnight, supra note 6, at R
1111–12 (noting that nullifying juries have been held in contempt for violating
their juror oath and have been prosecuted for perjury).  In fact, defendants are
directly benefitted by nullification, which is in contravention of the ideals of civil
disobedience wherein the disobedient is placing themselves in danger. See Berry
& Molina-Moore, supra note 23, at 93. R
28 See Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536, 554 (1843); see also Conrad, supra note 3, R
at 7 (discussing the origins of the trend against law-judging by juries).
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communicated by judges.29  During the same time period,
many other state courts announced similar decisions, with
some courts holding that statutes hastily enacted by legislators
to protect nullification were ineffective.30  This trend against
jury nullification followed closely behind the movement to de-
mocratize the jury31 and may have demonstrated a lack of gov-
ernmental trust in the citizenry, or at least in citizens who were
not white male property-owners.
Following the trend against nullification in the state
courts, the Supreme Court spoke out against jury nullification
in the 1895 case Sparf v. United States.32  The Court held that a
trial judge is not required to instruct juries of their right to
nullify or interpret the law.33  The holding was relatively nar-
row, because it did not forbid the instruction but rather de-
cided that jurors were not entitled to the instruction.
Nevertheless, this landmark case still severely limited the abil-
ity of defense attorneys to create a nullification defense for their
client.  Even if an attorney introduced the idea of nullification
during closing arguments, the judge could lawfully negate the
attempt by providing limiting instructions that implored the
jury to follow the letter of the law.
State courts and federal appellate courts continue to cite
Sparf as a demonstration of the Supreme Court’s disapproval
of jury nullification and thus strike down legislative attempts to
codify jury nullification through jury instructions.34  For exam-
29 See Pierce, 13 N.H. at 554.  However, the court did acknowledge that there
was nothing that could be done to wholly prevent the jury’s power to nullify. See
id. at 578.
30 See Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nul-
lification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1144–45 (2011).
31 See Conrad, supra note 3, at 11–12 (“[B]y the end of the Nineteenth cen- R
tury, the pressure was on to control the immigrants, blacks, and other elements
from all walks of life who found themselves sitting in judgment of their
neighbors.”).
32 156 U.S. 51 (1895); see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 10–13 (discussing the R
Supreme Court’s decision in detail); R. Alex Morgan, Comment, Jury Nullification
Should Be Made a Routine Part of the Criminal Justice System, but It Won’t Be, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1131 (1997) (highlighting the facts of the case).
33 See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 106; see also Conrad, supra note 3, at 13 (discuss- R
ing the narrow holding of Sparf); cf. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 176–77 (Gray, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]here is surely no reason why the chief security of the liberty of the
citizen—the judgment of his peers—should be held less sacred in a republic than
in a monarchy.”).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136–37 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (reinforcing Sparf by holding that there is no right to jury instructions about
nullification); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006–07 (4th Cir. 1969)
(holding the same as Dougherty); see also Morgan, supra note 32, at 1133 R
(describing the Dougherty decision, which held that judges do not have to inform
juries of their ability to acquit despite the evidence).
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ple, in United States v. Dougherty,35 the D.C. Circuit held that
judges do not have to inform juries of their ability to acquit
despite the evidence, though the court recognized that juries do
have the “occasionally appropriate” power to nullify.36
There are many reasons why there is judicial disapproval of
jury nullification, and especially of an explicit right to jury nul-
lification.  If jurors know about their ability to nullify, they may
exploit the process to create adverse, prejudicial, and unjust
outcomes.  For example, critics of the system have argued that
nullification has been used by bigoted white jurors to acquit
defendants who have been charged with hate crimes against
black victims, or, more recently, that nullification has been
used to acquit white police officers who have used unnecessary
lethal force against black citizens.37  While the possibility that
nullification may be used in this manner is troubling, data does
not suggest this has ever been a widespread problem.38  Fur-
thermore, the concern that juries may utilize the power of nulli-
fication in a corrupt manner is not a criticism of jury
nullification but of the jury system as a whole and, perhaps
more generally, of our society itself.39  If a community is cor-
35 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
36 See Morgan, supra note 32, at 1133 (describing Dougherty in more detail). R
37 See CONRAD, supra note 20, at 167–68. R
38 See id. at 168–69 (“There is very little concrete evidence or data on which
one could conclude that jury [nullification] has ever been widely or routinely used
in a racist or prejudiced manner.”).  For example, allegations of jury nullification
arose following the acquittal of seven ranchers who forcefully occupied the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon, which drew support from “right-wing
anti-government protestors.”  Matt Pearce & Rick Anderson, Leaders of Oregon
Wildlife Refuge Standoff are Acquitted of Federal Charges, LA TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016,
7:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-oregon-standoff-
jury-acquits-20161027-story.html [https://perma.cc/GKR7-75LD] (quoting
Kieran Suckling, Executive Director of the Center for Biological Diversity, as say-
ing, “I just didn’t think it was possible that 12 jurors could look at pictures of
armed men taking over a federal facility and say that’s not illegal,” and noting
that, during the trial, supporters of the ranchers “marched around the court-
house, in part hoping jurors might see one of their signs stating ‘Google: jury
nullification’”).  But juror accounts suggest that their decision was not indicative
of jury support for alt-right ideals; following the trial, one of the jurors said that
the acquittal was “not any form of affirmation of the defense’s various beliefs,
actions or aspirations” but instead was because “the jury thought the prosecution
did not prove its case.”  Anna Griffin & Kate Davidson, Legal Experts Discuss How
Oregon Standoff Jury Reached Verdict, OPB (Oct. 28, 2016, 6:31 PM), http://
www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-militia-news-updates/
how-jury-reach-not-guilty-verdict/ [https://perma.cc/WYN3-P8NA] (noting that
the prosecution chose to charge the defendants with conspiracy to prevent federal
employees from doing their jobs, a felony, instead of criminal trespass, a misde-
meanor that would have been easier to prove).
39 See CONRAD, supra note 20, at 169 (“The criminal trial jury has been de- R
scribed as the ‘conscience of the community.’  For that conscience to operate in a
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rupt, then certainly its voice within the justice system would
also be corrupt.  Bias and prejudice are problems that plague
the entire criminal justice system, and they alter how juries
view not only the law but also the facts of a case.40  Neverthe-
less, decisions made by criminal juries tend to show fewer ra-
cial disparities than decisions made by judges,41 and juries
rarely use nullification to release truly dangerous defend-
ants.42  So long as judges and prosecutors are able to use their
own discretion, juries should be allowed to use discretion as
well.  Jury nullification simply expands the power of the jury,
truly forcing the voice of the community into the courtroom.
Although jury nullification may occasionally lead to bad out-
comes, nullification creates a more just system overall.
Another common argument against nullification is that
other legal methods exist for citizens to change the law.43  If
citizens are unhappy with the law, they can appeal directly to
their representatives, which is the more traditional expression
of democracy in this country.  If legislators are not responsive
to their constituents, their constituents can vote to replace
them.  In the meantime, citizens are obligated to follow the law.
While this criticism may be true, the reality is that nullification
has occurred since the founding of the United States and con-
tinues to occur.44  In many cases, jury nullification is the only
way to ensure justice for vulnerable defendants, and it is also
an efficient way for the community to introduce its influence in
real time rather than wait for an election.  In addition, the
acquittal of a guilty defendant provides publicity to a commu-
nity issue that might not otherwise be discussed, and this pro-
vides other citizens with the opportunity to change the system
through more conventional means.
way in which we, as a society, can be proud, we must be confident that the
community is in fact a conscientious one.”).
40 See id. at 190–91.
41 See id. at 191 (“Criticizing the jury for being less than perfect is intellectu-
ally dishonest, at best, without also considering whether the available alternatives
may be worse.”).  An additional way to reduce biased jury judgments is to en-
courage practices that create diverse juries. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, On
Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial
Composition on Jury Deliberation, 90 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 598–600
(2006) (discussing the influence of racial diversity on decision making).
42 See id. at 149 (noting that homicide cases are relatively “immune” from
nullification except for cases involving physician-assisted suicide).
43 See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(noting that the protection of citizens’ rights “lay not in recognizing the right of
each jury to make its own law, but in following democratic processes for changing
the law”).
44 See Conrad, supra note 3, at 5. R
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B. The Prevailing Power to Nullify
Despite the precedent set in Sparf and the widespread judi-
cial disapproval that followed, jurors continue to have the
power to nullify the law.45  This power comes from the prosecu-
tion’s inability to reindict a defendant who has been acquitted,
even if the acquittal was a result of jury nullification.46  Fur-
thermore, because jurors are not required to give explanations
for their verdicts and their deliberations are done in secret,
courts have no definitive way to determine if the jury even
nullified.  Due to the jury’s inescapable power to nullify despite
judicial disapproval, the legal right to jury nullification remains
somewhat controversial.47  Jurors can nullify without facing
prosecution, but the court has no obligation to inform the ju-
rors of this power.  In fact, there are many barriers in the way,
including juror oaths, the voir dire process, and cautioning
instructions from the judge.48
Nevertheless, the recent Supreme Court trend towards
originalism49 suggests that jury nullification may have a resur-
gence in approval.50  For example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
the Supreme Court again recognized that the right to trial by
jury is meant to “guard against a spirit of oppression and tyr-
anny on the part of rulers.”51  Some scholars argue that in the
post-Sparf era, the jury must accept the judge’s interpretation
of the “ordinary law,” but also must answer to a “higher law”
through which they are the ultimate interpreters of what is
just.52  Thus, if there is an overriding moral reason to acquit a
45 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895); Bressler, supra note
30, at 1144–45. R
46 See Conrad, supra note 3, at 2 (“[T]his alleged ‘lawlessness’ is not only R
unpunishable, but unreviewable and absolute.”).
47 See CONRAD, supra note 20, at 7–8. R
48 See McKnight, supra note 6, at 1110–12. R
49 Newly confirmed Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch will likely follow in
his predecessor Justice Antonin Scalia’s footsteps in terms of his commitment to
originalism. See Aaron Blake, Neil Gorsuch, Antonin Scalia and Originalism, Ex-
plained, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuch-antonin-scalia-and-originalism-explained/?
utm_term=.8834872334e6 [https://perma.cc/DRK8-AJV5].
50 But cf. Bressler, supra note 30, at 1135–37 (arguing that Reconstruction R
informs why Sparf was a correct decision, even considering the recent trend
towards originalism in the Supreme Court).
51 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 (4th ed. 1873)); see also Considering
the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 39 (2011) (statement of Scalia, J.) (dis-
cussing the Founders’ intentions for the right to a jury, which included a belief
that judges were not enough to prevent against government tyranny).
52 Christie, supra note 12, at 1300. R
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defendant, the jury must do so in order to protect the commu-
nity’s interest in a just society.
If this is the case, more needs to be done to protect the
jury’s ability to nullify.  Because defendants do not have the
right to request nullification instructions,53 a nullification de-
fense would require the jury to arrive at the decision to nullify
by themselves.  Unfortunately for any defendant relying upon a
nullification defense, research shows that less than 10% of
jurors know about the power to nullify.54  Without prompting
from the judge, many juries will not realize that they have this
power, especially after taking an oath to uphold the law.  Not
only that, but even if one juror decided to nullify, that juror
would also need to convince the requisite number of other ju-
rors to agree or the case would still result in a conviction (or, at
best, a mistrial).
In the 1990s, advocacy groups developed renewed interest
in dispensing information about the power to nullify.55  The
groups petitioned local governments to establish laws that
would require judges to inform the jury of their right to deliver
an independent verdict.56  Following this push, multiple states
considered relevant legislation.57  In the early 1990s, jury nulli-
fication legislation passed on two different occasions in the
Oklahoma State House and the Arizona State House,58 and at
least seven other states considered either constitutional
amendments or legislation concerning the right to nullifica-
tion.59  Nevertheless, the attempts were generally
unsuccessful.
The jury’s power to nullify is especially important now be-
cause less and less power is given to the modern day criminal
jury.  Over 94% of state criminal cases are decided through
plea bargains, with many of the remaining cases decided
through bench trials.60  The prevalence of plea bargains allows
53 See Brody & Rivera, supra note 19, at 156.
54 See id. at 160, 163 (noting that 0% and 6% of respondents in two separate
surveys did not have “[f]ull knowledge” of jury nullification).
55 See, e.g., History, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASSOCIATION (2015), http://fija.org/
about/history/ [https://perma.cc/CKH8-FVUZ].
56 See id.
57 See CONRAD, supra note 20, at 117–24. R
58 Id. at 163.
59 See Creagan, supra note 9, at 1122 (discussing in detail these attempts at R
nullification legislation).
60 Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-
hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/6KEU-
JYV3] (reporting that 97% of federal criminal cases and 94% of state criminal
cases are decided through plea bargains).
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for unchecked prosecutorial discretion in bringing charges in
criminal cases.61  Without guidance from the community, the
criminal justice system is in danger of being solely influenced
by the government’s interest.  Alongside the vast discretion
given to both prosecutors and judges, jury nullification is a way
for the community to utilize their own discretion and conform
the justice system to community standards.62  Thus, nullifica-
tion can be interpreted as a reclamation of the democratic
check on the judicial system, an issue that should be of impor-
tance to both lawmakers and policymakers.
Furthermore, without jury nullification, rigid rules will re-
sult in the unjust punishment of certain morally-innocent de-
fendants, which would violate all theories of justice.63  For
example, in 1988, Darlene and Jerry Span were attacked by
federal marshals after being questioned about the location of a
fugitive.64  The Spans innocently told the marshals that the
man they were searching for was too old to be their brother,
who shared the same name as the fugitive.  Despite the fact
that they were telling the truth, the marshals disbelieved them,
physically assaulted them from behind, and later accused
them of resisting arrest despite there being no probable cause
for the arrest.  At their subsequent trial for resisting arrest,
tearful jurors found the Spans guilty based on the judge’s jury
instructions regarding the law, which relied heavily on the per-
spective of the arresting officers.  Along with their verdict, sev-
eral jurors signed a statement that said the “law [was]
completely unfair and against everything that the United States
stands for.”65
If these jurors had been informed of their ability to nullify,
the Spans would never have been found guilty.  While resisting
arrest is a legitimate crime and there is reason to give some
deference to the perspective of the arresting officer, no justice
61 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243,
1252–58 (2011) (discussing prosecutorial discretion to bring charges in criminal
cases, which includes the ability to refuse to bring charges in a particular case
because of a disagreement with the application of the law, a phenomenon other-
wise known as “prosecutorial nullification”).
62 See id. at 1264 (“[T]he analogy between prosecutorial nullification and jury
nullification is difficult to resist.”); Morgan, supra note 32, at 1140 (discussing R
discretion).
63 See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL
157–58 (1988) (quoting a juror who convicted a sympathetic defendant of first-
degree murder for assisting his wife with suicide as saying, “We had no choice.
The law does not allow for sympathy.”).
64 CONRAD, supra note 20, at 155–56. R
65 Id. at 156.
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was done in this particular case by convicting and punishing
the Spans, who were physically and emotionally abused by the
federal marshals.66  Jury nullification can create a more just
system, which grants leniency for extreme cases that fall
outside of the purpose of certain statutes.  This is just one
example of why the power to nullify continues to be important.
C. When and Why Do Juries Nullify?
Despite almost universal judicial disapproval of jury nulli-
fication, jurors continue to nullify.  Research shows that juries
are more likely to hang when the jurors believe the law itself is
unfair.67  Additionally, research shows that a juror’s under-
standing of the law does not predict the likelihood that the
juror will comply with the law,68 but jurors generally attempt to
follow the law and the directions they are given.69  This com-
mitment to the law generally persists, even when a juror does
not agree with the particular law in question.70  Thus, while
there is general compliance with the law, strong moral consid-
erations or appeals to a “higher law” may compel a jury to
believe they may be justified to ignore the ordinary law.71
Before discussing why lawmakers specifically should want
to protect jury nullification, it is important to first understand
why juries continue to nullify and how those reasons fit into a
democratic system.  Traditionally, there are two situations in
which jurors are compelled to nullify: when the jury feels empa-
thy for a specific defendant, and when the jury rejects the law
itself.72
66 See id. at 155–56.  An appeals court eventually vacated the Spans’s convic-
tions, but not until eight years after their arrest. See id.
67 See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A
Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1249, 1272 (2003) (“The jury’s collective sense of the fairness of the
law it is asked to apply to the facts in the case . . . is often related to the jury’s
verdict.”).
68 See Richard L. Wiener, Kristen Habert, Gina Shkodriani & Caryn Staebler,
The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification: Predicting When Jurors Disobey the
Law, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1379, 1395–97 (1991).
69 See Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and
Should a Jury Reject the Law to do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 253 (1993).
But see Wiener et al., supra note 68, at 1395–97 (finding that juror’s understand-
ing of the law does not necessarily predict compliance with the law).
70 See Weinstein, supra note 69, at 253–54 (concluding that the only time
jury nullification becomes prevalent is when social issues are left unaddressed,
when conditions are such that the case cannot be decided within the law, or law
enforcement is poor).
71 See Brown, supra note 1, at 1152; Christie, supra note 12, at 1300. R
72 See Brenner M. Fissell, Jury Nullification and the Rule of Law, 19 LEGAL
THEORY 217, 219–20 (2013).  Fissell also includes a third category: opposition to
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1. Type 1: The Jury Feels Empathy for a Specific
Defendant
A jury may believe that a particular defendant in a particu-
lar set of circumstances is worthy of acquittal despite being
legally guilty.  This situation is best explained through utilita-
rian principles of punishment: the jury believes that the defen-
dant should not be punished because, given the totality of the
circumstances of the crime, there is no benefit to society for
punishing the defendant.73  In other words, although the de-
fendant broke the ordinary law, the jury has a moral obligation
to follow a “higher law” because punishment will result in the
defendant’s suffering despite no benefit to society.
An example of this type of nullification would include the
highly publicized New Hampshire case against fifty-nine-year-
old Doug Darrell.74  After marijuana plants were found in his
backyard, Darrell was charged with felony marijuana cultiva-
tion.  During the trial, Darrell’s attorney argued a nullification
defense, claiming punishing Darrell would be unfair because
the marijuana was used only by Darrell and only for medical
and religious purposes.75  The jury acquitted Darrell of the
charges, claiming that the community would not be better off if
Darrell, a “peaceful man,” was punished.76  Here, the potential
harm to this particular defendant was believed to outweigh the
benefit to the community, and therefore a moral duty to acquit
existed.
This type of nullification also encompasses cases in which
there is blatant government misconduct or vindictiveness.  An
government misconduct.  However, government misconduct is typically either
specific (which would fit into Type 1) or systemic (which would fit into Type 2).
73 See Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY § 2–2.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2014 ed.), https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/ [https://
perma.cc/H7FV-U5DA]; see also Christie, supra note 12, at 1300 (discussing the
perspective that, with respect to deviations from the law, “moral considerations
are only relevant insofar as they are reflected in the ultimate ends of our legal and
political order”).
74 See Hilary Hanson, Doug Darrell Acquitted of Marijuana Charges Through
Jury Nullification in New Hampshire, HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 17, 2012, 2:07 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/17/doug-darrell-marijuana-jury-nul
lification_n_1890824.html [https://perma.cc/6U35-HTV5].
75 Id.; Ashby Jones, Another Path to ‘Not Guilty’: New Hampshire Looks to
Ensure Juries Are Informed of the ‘Nullification’ Principle, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23,
2014), http://wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230441910457932300414
8847482 [https://perma.cc/KF42-XCGC].
76 Hanson, supra note 74 (quoting a self-described “straitlaced little old lady” R
juror who believed her “community would be poorer rather than better off had
[Darrell] been convicted”).
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example of this would be the case of Darlene and Jerry Span,
discussed in the previous subsection.77  The federal marshals
in this case acted so atrociously that any benefit that would
come to society from the punishment of the Spans is greatly
outweighed by the harm caused by validating the marshals’
misbehavior.  Thus, a higher moral authority validates ignoring
the ordinary law in this particular case.
This type of nullification is necessary to create legal loop-
holes for deserving defendants.  While lawmakers can try their
best to draft broadly encompassing laws to prohibit harmful
behavior while also providing exceptions for those citizens who
must necessarily break social mores, no law is perfect.  Jury
nullification that results from empathy for one specific defen-
dant’s circumstances is a necessary supplement to a system of
laws in order to maintain justice alongside community support.
2. Type 2: The Jury Rejects the Law Itself
The jury may believe that the law is so out of touch with
community standards that the law itself is unjust.  Unlike Type
1, this type of nullification is best explained through retribu-
tivist principles: a defendant here does not deserve punishment
because they have not inflicted any harm upon the community,
and therefore the law is unjust.78  The jurors are not appealing
to any higher moral authority, but they are instead attempting
to invalidate the law that the defendant violated and thus pre-
vent unwanted government overreach.  This is often considered
to be the most controversial type of nullification because the
jury here is exclusively judging the merits of the ordinary law
instead of being guided by a “higher law.”79
In contrast to the case of Doug Darrell, which provided an
example of Type 1 nullification, a jury utilizing Type 2 nullifica-
tion is not motivated by the qualities of the defendant himself.
Instead, the jury feels that laws prohibiting growing marijuana
go against community standards and would be unjust applied
to any defendant.  In these cases, the jury does not have a
moral duty to the defendant, but rather wants to act in defiance
of the law.  Other examples include opposition to laws banning
sodomy or to the Fugitive Slave Act.  Type 2 nullification would
77 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text; CONRAD, supra note 20, at R
155–56.
78 See Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY § 3.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2016/entries/justice-retributive/ [https://perma.cc/B6XJ-3T6P].
79 See Christie, supra note 12, at 1300; Fissell, supra note 72, at 217–21. R
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also be used if the jury intended to protest systemic issues
within the justice system, as exemplified by Paul Butler’s pro-
posal that black jurors should always vote to acquit whenever a
black defendant is accused of a small, victimless crime.80
This type of jury nullification is the best parallel to sanc-
tioned civil disobedience.  By acquitting a legally guilty defen-
dant, the jury is attempting to show its disapproval of some
aspect of the law and advocate for change.  The jury’s desire is
not to protect the specific defendant, but to protect any defen-
dant accused of the same crime.  However, without lawmakers’
interest in jury nullification, there is no true hope for legislative
change as a result of jury independence.  Jury nullification
only feebly serves its purpose by preventing injustice for one
individual defendant but does not bring about greater change
within the system.  Thus, for jury nullification protesting a spe-
cific law to be truly effective, nullification must be legitimized.
If lawmakers legitimize and support jury nullification, jurors
will be able to use their platform to introduce community stan-
dards into the judicial system and draw attention to the laws
and policies the community would like lawmakers to change.
This would be a direct democratic influence on the criminal
justice system and a true check on the government’s
lawmaking.
II
HOW TO CODIFY NULLIFICATION
There are several traditional ways in which the right to
nullification has been introduced into a trial through either
state statutes or state constitutions.  First, a judge can be re-
quired, upon request from the defense, to provide the jury with
nullification instructions.81  Second, the judge can be required
to allow the defense to inform the jury of its ability to nullify
and present relevant nullification evidence during the presen-
tation of their case.82  In order to be successful, these two
scenarios would require either legislative action or the courts’
recognition of a right to nullification.  Finally, a defense attor-
80 See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 715 (1995); see also Otis B. Grant, Rational
Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and Economics of Jury Nullification,
14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 145, 145–47 (2004) (agreeing with Butler’s theory of
race-based jury nullification).
81 See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 32, at 1134–35, 1141–42 (explaining that R
allowing the defense to raise a nullification argument requires the judge to offer a
jury nullification instruction).
82 See id. at 1140–41.
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ney can construct their arguments to implicitly communicate
to the jury that they should acquit if they feel a moral duty to
the defendant.  This is the current state of the law in most
jurisdictions, where there is no recognized right to jury judg-
ment of the law.83  After discussing the benefits and problems
of these three methods, this Note will discuss how New Hamp-
shire attempted to codify jury nullification and why this at-
tempt was unsuccessful.  This example will demonstrate why
explicit support from legislators is crucial.
A. Method 1: The Judge Can Give Jury Instructions
This is the current method used in Maryland, where the
right of the jury to judge the law is included in the state consti-
tution.84  In this method, if the defense makes a request, the
judge must provide some form of instructions to the jury re-
garding its right to judge the law.  This method is the most
protective of jury nullification because the jurors know of their
ability to nullify85 and the judge does not contradict the defen-
dant’s arguments for nullification.  In practice, jury instruc-
tions like this do seem to increase the likelihood of nullification
based on moral reasons.  When jurors are given nullification
instructions, they are more likely to vote guilty in a drunk
driving case, but less likely to do so in a case of euthanasia.86
Additionally, compared to ordinary jurors, jurors given nullifi-
cation instructions spend more of their deliberation time dis-
cussing characteristics of the defendant and their own
personal experiences.87
83 See id. at 1134 (noting that both the Maryland and Indiana constitutions,
which give juries the right to determine questions of both law and fact, are excep-
tions to the general trend); see also Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The
Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106
YALE L.J. 2563, 2569–74 (1997) (explaining Maryland and Indiana’s constitutions
in more detail).
84 See Morgan, supra note 32, at 1134–35. R
85 This conclusion rests upon the assumption that jurors have paid attention
to and understand the instructions given by the judge.  Some research suggests
that jurors struggle to comprehend judicial instructions, which further limits the
effectiveness of this method. See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into
the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 454–58 (“Empirical studies
for at least the last thirty years . . . have shown that jurors have difficulty under-
standing jury instructions . . . because the instructions use legal jargon or ambig-
uous language, awkward grammatical constructions, and an organization that is
difficult to discern.”) (internal citations omitted).
86 Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and
Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 33–35 (1985).
87 See id. at 33–36.
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This method requires the most amount of judicial compli-
ance.  Without a policy requiring all judges to give nullification
instructions at the defense’s request, nullification instructions
will be at the discretion of the judge, which may further cause
state actors to supersede the jury’s role of preventing govern-
ment overreach.  Only particularly understanding judges will
be compelled to help jurors ignore the judge’s own interpreta-
tion of the law.
Nevertheless, some scholars have argued that nullification
instructions erode the moral responsibility of the jury.88  Sanc-
tioned jury instructions may violate the purity of disobeying the
law for those attempting to be civilly disobedient.  For Type 1
nullification to have integrity, the case needs to have a moral
appeal that is higher than the ordinary law, and sanctioned
instructions remove any sort of moral dilemma for the jurors.
Judicial approval removes most of the potential costs associ-
ated with jury nullification, which may result in juries acquit-
ting undeserving defendants.  Thus, while this method may be
the most protective of the right to nullification, this method is
not ideal because it does not maintain the integrity of either
type of nullification.
B. Method 2: The Defense Can Explicitly Introduce a
Nullification Defense
This method does not require judges to give jury instruc-
tions about their ability to decide the law, but it allows defense
attorneys to tell jurors of the right and present necessary miti-
gating evidence to convince the jurors that the defendant’s sit-
uation is worthy of nullification.  This method would allow
mitigating evidence to be admitted, even if the traditional rules
of evidence would find the evidence to be irrelevant.  If this
method is used, defense attorneys may be required to give
prosecutors notice of the nullification defense so that the state
can prepare appropriate opposing arguments, including the
introduction of aggravating factors.89  This method allows
judges to avoid violating their own duty to uphold the law by
giving contradictory instructions to the jury.90
Unfortunately, this method may not result in the jury truly
understanding their rights because judicial instructions may
88 See Christie, supra note 12, at 1303–04; see also supra notes 12–13, 21 R
and accompanying text.
89 David N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury
Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 923–24 (1995).
90 See Morgan, supra note 32, at 1140–41. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN505.txt unknown Seq: 19 26-JUL-17 10:14
2017] THE DISOBEDIENT JURY 1419
challenge the defense’s arguments by imploring the jury to fol-
low the law.  Without judicial support, jurors may be less likely
to vote with their conscience—which would maintain the moral
integrity of Type 1 nullification, but also reduce the prevalence
of Type 2 nullification.  Thus, while this may be a good option
for legislators who wish to excuse deserving defendants with-
out allowing for protest of the law entirely, this method reduces
the jury’s ability to prevent government overreach.
C. Method 3: The Defense Can Admit Mitigating Evidence
in Support of Nullification
If there is no codified right to jury nullification and judges
do not permit the defense to introduce a nullification argu-
ment, defense attorneys must covertly introduce the concept of
nullification into the courtroom.  An attorney wishing to utilize
this defense without judicial consent must skillfully design the
case with nullification in mind from beginning to end.  This
includes everything from voir dire to the closing statement.
The attorney must not only convince the jury that conviction
under the law would be improper, but also that the defendant
had non-threatening motives and any punishment would be
unnecessarily severe.91  The attorney must do all of this with-
out mentioning jury nullification.  A skilled attorney can try to
broadly frame the issues of the case, but ensuring that all
relevant mitigating evidence will be admissible can be challeng-
ing.92  Even if the attorney succeeds by creating empathy
within the jury, the attorney must still implicitly communicate
the jury’s ability to ignore the law and acquit a deserving
defendant.93
This method is quite difficult to execute successfully, espe-
cially without judicial support.  Too few jurors understand
their power,94 and thus implicit communication from defense
counsel is unlikely to succeed.  A successful method of intro-
ducing jury nullification must be somewhat public in order to
increase the community’s understanding of their rights as ju-
rors.  For this method to be successful, the defense attorney
would need to be allowed to make explicit pleas for nullifica-
tion, which may require legislative intervention to prevent judi-
cial obstruction.
91 See Conrad, supra note 3, at 35–38. R
92 See id. at 35.
93 See id.
94 See Brody & Rivera, supra note 19, at 160, 163.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN505.txt unknown Seq: 20 26-JUL-17 10:14
1420 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1401
D. New Hampshire’s Attempt to Codify Jury Nullification
In 2012, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to cod-
ify the right to jury nullification through the use of jury instruc-
tions.  This attempt exemplifies the conflict between judicial
disapproval of jury nullification and legislative intent, and how
legislative intent can be overridden by judicial opposition.
Prior to 2012 and following Pierce v. State,95 a New Hampshire
jury did not have the explicit right to judge the law.  Standard
jury instructions included phrasing called the Wentworth in-
struction, which stated: “If you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether the State has proved any one or more of the elements
of the crime charged, you must find the defendant not guilty.
However, if you find that the State has proved all of the ele-
ments of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant guilty.”96  While the textual differ-
ence between “must” and “should” implies some ability for jury
independence, the distinction was subtle enough that, without
prompting, jurors may not have understood that the word
“should” gave them the leeway to acquit a legally guilty defen-
dant.  The phrasing was opaque enough that judges had dis-
cretion as to whether they would permit nullification defenses
or include explicit nullification instructions on a case-by-case
basis.97
This subtle protection of jury nullification was questioned
in State v. Bonacorsi.98  In this case, the trial judge allowed the
defense to put forth a not “too strenuous[ ]” nullification de-
fense during closing arguments.99  The defense requested addi-
tional explicit jury nullification instructions, but the trial judge
instead gave the instruction that the judge was “the only one
that can tell [the jury] what the law is in [the] case.”100  The
defense appealed.  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held
that, even though the trial judge had agreed to permit the nulli-
fication defense, the defendant was not entitled to more explicit
jury nullification instructions.101  In addition, the court upheld
the Wentworth instruction as permissible and decided that
more lenient or explicit instructions were not necessary to pro-
tect the impression of jury nullification.102  While the decision
95 13 N.H. 536 (1843).
96 See State v. Wentworth, 395 A.2d 858, 863 (N.H. 1978) (emphasis added).
97 See State v. Paul, 104 A.3d 1058, 1062 (N.H. 2014).
98 648 A.2d 469 (N.H. 1994).
99 Id. at 469.
100 Id. at 470.
101 See id. at 471–72.
102 See id. at 470–71.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN505.txt unknown Seq: 21 26-JUL-17 10:14
2017] THE DISOBEDIENT JURY 1421
somewhat limited the right to jury nullification, the case
demonstrated that there was some judicial approval of jury
nullification at the time in New Hampshire—at least some
judges permitted defense attorneys to present nullification ar-
guments, as long as the arguments were not too forceful.
Then, in 2011, a bill was introduced to the New Hampshire
State House which would have required the judge in all court
proceedings to instruct the jury of its right to judge both the
law and the facts.103  The judge would also have to instruct the
jury that they had the right to nullify any actions that they
considered to be “unjust.”104  Further, the bill would have given
attorneys the right to pose a nullification defense to the jury,
thus removing any unfairness and uncertainty introduced by
judicial discretion or cautioning instructions.  This bill was
overwhelmingly supportive of jury nullification and extended to
protect all traditional methods of introducing the topic of jury
nullification into the courtroom.  The legislators who created
the bill believed that juries function best when fully informed of
their rights and thus all juries should be informed of their
ability to nullify;105 the right to nullification protected the dem-
ocratic process in ways that uninformed jurors could not.
The New Hampshire House Judiciary Committee signifi-
cantly modified this bill,106 which eventually became RSA Sec-
tion 519:23-a.  While the original bill was incredibly protective
of jury nullification, the edited version was more obtuse.  RSA
Section 519:23-a intended only to allow defense attorneys to
inform jurors of their right to nullify during their oral argu-
ments and did not require judges to pose nullification instruc-
tions to the jury themselves.107  In 2012, the New Hampshire
legislature passed Section 519:23-a.  The law states, “In all
criminal proceedings the court shall permit the defense to in-
form the jury of its right to judge the facts and the application
of the law in relation to the facts in controversy.”108  Some
legislators and attorneys were concerned that, unlike the origi-
nal bill, Section 519:23-a was not robust enough to protect the
103 H.B. 146, 2011 Sess. (N.H. 2011) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2011).
104 Id.
105 See id. (“The jury system functions at its best when it is fully informed of
the jury’s prerogatives.”).
106 See H.B. 146, 2012 Sess., ch. 243 (N.H. 2012) (as amended June 22,
2012).
107 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519:23-a (2016).
108 Id.
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right to nullification.109  Because judges did not have to inform
jurors of their power to nullify, jurors would not always under-
stand their freedom to make independent decisions.  Judicial
involvement and the non-transparent Wentworth instruction
could still prevent the democratic function of the jury that the
legislators had intended to protect.
Alongside the passage of this law, jury nullification was
brought to the forefront of community discussions after Doug
Darrell was acquitted of marijuana charges.110  In addition to
the defense’s reliance upon a jury nullification argument, the
judge in this case informed the jury of their right to nullify.  The
success of this defense strategy renewed community interest in
nullification and demonstrated how powerful nullification in-
structions can be: given relevant instructions, a jury acquitted
a defendant whose punishment would have been unjust given
the community’s standards.111
Then, in October 2014, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
decided State v. Paul.112  The defendant in Paul was charged
with multiple small drug crimes, and he attempted to use the
nullification defense codified in Section 519:23-a.113  The de-
fense requested jury instructions to explicitly inform jurors of
their right to nullify.114  The prosecution proposed alternative
instructions that still upheld the meaning of jury nullification,
and the defense did not object to the alteration.  The instruc-
tions read:
We are a nation governed by laws.  You should follow the
instruction on the law as I give it to you, including the in-
struction that you should find the defendant guilty if the
state has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  How-
ever, if finding the defendant guilty is repugnant to your
sense of justice, and you feel that a conviction would not be a
109 See H.B. 1452, 163d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014) (proposing a bill to
the House of Representatives which would require judges to inform juries of their
right to nullify); see also Jones, supra note 75 (discussing the original bill) R
(“[M]any New Hampshire criminal-defense lawyers say the 2012 law . . . makes it
difficult to make [a nullification] argument for acquittal.”).
110 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. R
111 See Hanson, supra note 74. R
112 State v. Paul, 104 A.3d 1058 (N.H. 2014) (holding that the defendant was
not entitled to a specific jury nullification instruction and that the court does not
have to allow the defense to inform the jury that they can ignore the law).
113 Paul was convicted on three counts of the sale of an ounce or more of
marijuana, one count of possession with intent to distribute an ounce or more of
marijuana, and one count of the sale of LSD. Id. at 1058.
114 See id. at 1059.
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fair or just result in this case, it is within your power to acquit
even if you find the state has met its burden of proof.115
The trial judge denied the request to give the proposed nullifi-
cation instructions.116  After being convicted of all charges, the
defendant appealed on the basis that the trial court erred by
denying his request for nullification instructions.  Instead, the
trial court gave two standard jury instructions that negated the
defendant’s attempted nullification defense.  The first instruc-
tion was the Wentworth instruction.117  The other instruction
stated, “You should follow the law as I explain it regardless of
any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be.”118
The defense argued that Section 519:23-a gave defendants the
right to a nullification defense, with the implication that judges
must not give contradictory instructions.
In the opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court unani-
mously held that Section 519:23-a only codified the existing
function of the jury and was not codification of the right to
nullify.119  Not only did the court hold that the legislation was
never meant to address nullification, but the court also ques-
tioned the constitutionality of any nullification defense.120  The
court determined that the plain language of the statute did not
directly state that the jury had the right to sit in judgment of
the law, but instead said only that the jury could judge the
application of the law to the facts of the case.121  The court
believed that this has always been one of the traditional jury
functions, and thus the court did not consider the language of
the statute narrow enough to imply an additional right to nulli-
fication.  The decision essentially nullified the possibility for a
nullification defense in New Hampshire by holding that a judge
does not have to permit defense counsel to argue that the jury
can judge the law.  The court believed that if the legislators
really wanted to protect jury nullification, the bill would have
115 Id.
116 See id. at 1059–60.
117 See State v. Wentworth, 395 A.2d 858, 863 (N.H. 1978).
118 Paul, 104 A.3d at 1060.
119 See id. at 1061–62.
120 See id. at 1062 (“It is well established that jury nullification is neither a
right of the defendant nor a defense recognized by law.”).
121 Id. at 1059–61.  The court also cited to the doctrine of “constitutional
avoidance.” Id. at 1062; see also State v. Ploof, 34 A.3d 563, 572 (N.H. 2011)
(discussing the concept of constitutional avoidance, which requires the judiciary
to construe statutes so as not to conflict with the constitution).
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been passed in its original, explicit form.  This decision has
since been upheld on several occasions.122
Despite the ruling, lawmakers in New Hampshire continue
to fight for the right to nullify.  On February 2, 2015, a bill was
proposed in the New Hampshire State House to amend RSA
Section 519:23-a.123  The amendment would make it “an act of
maladministration” for a judge to limit an attorney from in-
forming the jury of its right to judge both the facts and the
application of the law to the facts.124  Thus, judges would not
be able to provide the jury with any instructions that might
undercut the defense’s nullification arguments.  This bill was
introduced in order to correct any ambiguities that may have
led to the holding in State v. Paul, and it demonstrates the type
of direct action that legislators must take in order to protect the
jury’s power to nullify.  Without explicit legislation, judges can
override the presumption of jury independence given by a
vague statute.
III
LEGISLATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT JURY NULLIFICATION
As demonstrated by the recent attempts by the state legis-
lature in New Hampshire to codify the right to jury nullification
and the subsequent judicial opposition, jury nullification re-
mains a controversial topic.  Despite the historical beginnings
of jury nullification, the current “legal establishment” opposes
jury nullification, and, in the 1990s, even “successfully lobbied
against legislative proposals at the state level.”125  One of the
arguments against jury nullification is that jurors should not
have the power to overturn laws or decide how laws should be
applied because this unchecked power could lead to anarchy
and negate the labor of lawmakers.126  Despite this opposition,
122 See, e.g., State v. McIntire, No. 2013-0249, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 146, at *1
(N.H. Jan. 22, 2015) (“In [Paul], we held that RSA 519:23-a is not a jury nullifica-
tion statute.  Rather, we held, the statute merely codifies pre-existing law regard-
ing the function of the jury in criminal cases, including the well-established
principle that jury nullification is neither a right of the defendant nor a defense
recognized by law.” (internal citations omitted)); see also State v. Knowles, No.
2014-0124, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 205, at*1 (N.H. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing the reasoning
in Paul).
123 H.B. 246, 15-0218 (N.H. 2015); see also Jones, supra note 75 (discussing
renewed attempts in the context of the larger jury nullification debate in New
Hampshire).
124 H.B. 246, 15-0218.
125 Morgan, supra note 32, at 1143. R
126 See id. at 1136.
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lawmakers should push to protect jury nullification and, thus,
protect the voice of the people they were elected to represent.
In our current system, the jury is given relatively few op-
portunities to fulfill its traditional function of prevention of gov-
ernment overreach.  While the democratic system is
represented through the election of judges, district attorneys,
and legislators, true community involvement in the criminal
justice system does not occur unless independent citizens are
able to make decisions in real criminal cases.  Involvement on a
jury gives citizens an inside perspective of how the law and the
criminal justice system work in practice; research shows that
citizens are more engaged in politics after serving on a jury,
and they are even more likely to vote in subsequent years.127
This is because a citizen may not understand the conse-
quences of their vote and the legislators that they have elected
until they have experienced the law in action.  Jury nullifica-
tion allows citizens to effect change in the moment, without
waiting for a ballot box.
Not only does jury nullification maintain the democratic
function of the jury, but it also improves the integrity of the
lawmaking process.  Within the current populist climate,128
127 John Gastil, E. Pierre Deess & Phil Weiser, Civic Awakening in the Jury
Room: A Test of the Connection Between Jury Deliberation and Political Participa-
tion, 64 J. POL. 585, 592–93 (2002).
128 The recent trend towards populism is demonstrated by the success of
President Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, during which he used
populist rhetoric to gain support.  See Mabel Berezin, Donald Trump is a Uniquely
American Populist, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 20, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/arti
cle/139434/donald-trump-uniquely-american-populist [https://perma.cc/
VV2A-GCBQ] (“Trump claimed that he was the ‘only one’ who could save ordinary
Americans.  He would be their ‘champion.’  He would ‘fight’ for them.  He would
‘win’ for them.”); Frank Bruni, The Pretend Populism of Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/opinion/sunday/the-
pretend-populism-of-donald-trump.html [https://perma.cc/W6AM-7PC7]
(“Trump styled himself as a populist during his . . . provocative campaign, claim-
ing to hear, understand and channel the working-class Americans so wrongly
ignored by other leaders.”).  A similar approach was used by Senator Bernie Sand-
ers (albeit with a slightly different tone) during the Democratic primary, sug-
gesting that populist messages are attractive to both ends of the political
spectrum. See Michael Kazin, How Can Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Both
Be ‘Populist’?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
03/27/magazine/how-can-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-both-be-populist
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VBK5-UQB7] (“[E]very major ‘populist’ insurgency
is a warning about serious problems festering in our politics.”); Bart Bonikowski &
Noam Gidron, Trump and Sanders Aren’t Blazing New Trails.  Populism Has Run
Through U.S. Politics for a Very Long Time, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/28/trump-and-
sanders-arent-so-different-populism-has-run-through-u-s-politics-for-a-very-
long-time/ [https://perma.cc/Q3WG-AV56] (“[M]any pundits proclaim that this
election is ushering in a new era of populist politics.”).
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lawmakers should act as agents of their constituents rather
than as trustees.  As agents, lawmakers should want their laws
to reflect the actual desires of the community and not just what
lawmakers believe is in the community’s best interest.129  In
contrast, the judicial branch, which traditionally pledges to
uphold justice in light of the law, has reason to discourage
nullification.  The judicial oath to uphold the law is why the
legislators need to be the body that initially embraces nullifica-
tion, not judges.
Lawmakers choosing to encourage both Type 1 and Type 2
nullification honor the agentic duty to their constituents.  The
creation of law that is perfectly tailored to punish those who are
deserving without making the law either too broad (thus cap-
turing the undeserving) or too narrow (thus allowing the de-
serving to go free) is extremely difficult.  Type 1 nullification
gives legislators the ability to create broad laws without con-
cern that extreme and undeserving outliers will be punished
along with the actual targets of the law.  Necessary but unpre-
dictable exceptions to laws can be excused by the jury, while
the law itself can remain intact for when the community agrees
that the lawbreaker should be punished.  Legislators can in-
stead focus their efforts on creating new laws and policies that
benefit and address the concerns of the communities they have
vowed to serve.
In addition to allowing legislators to have more flexibility in
their lawmaking, nullification is a way for lawmakers to get
direct feedback from their constituents about whether laws
and policies are supported.  In an agentic system, lawmakers
have the responsibility to pass and permit enforcement of laws
that reinforce community support, safety, and democracy.130
If the legislature has enacted a law that is continually being
ignored and “outvoted” by juries using Type 2 nullification, the
legislators should want to overturn the law and replace it with
something that better addresses the concerns of their constitu-
ents.  For this reason, legislators should welcome the jury as a
final democratic check.  Widespread use of nullification can
bring attention to flaws in the legal system that the community
wants to be fixed and is another way for legislators to hear the
voice of their constituents.  With government support for nulli-
fication, jurors can be less secretive and more willing to discuss
129 See Morgan, supra note 32, at 1137 (questioning whether “governmental R
actors should pass and enforce laws that lack a base of popular community
support”).
130 See id.
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when and why they nullified.  This would allow the publicity
necessary for real change to occur.
While lawmakers may initially believe that jury nullifica-
tion gives jurors too much power and that the power may lead
to arbitrary verdicts, other actors within the criminal system
already have the power of almost unchecked discretion.  For
example, prosecutors have great discretion to determine
against whom to bring charges and what charges to bring.131
This discretion leads to disparities in charging and sentencing,
and those disparities are influenced by government and execu-
tive interests.  For example, the War on Drugs that began in the
1980s resulted in increased police and prosecutorial focus on
small drug crimes.132  This discretionary shift in focus dispro-
portionately targeted young black men and contributed to
mass incarceration.  One way to ensure that laws are respon-
sive to the needs of the community rather than potentially
harmful government interests is to grant discretion to the jury
as well.  This gives jurors the ability to fulfill their original role
of preventing tyranny, despite being excluded from most crimi-
nal cases.133  Jurors can judge both the facts of the case and
whether the law should be applied in the way the government is
suggesting.  This power will act as a check on the government
and may induce fewer defendants to accept manipulative plea
deals because they have faith that the jury is empowered to
protect them.
Due to judicial opposition, if lawmakers agree to protect
the power of jury nullification, this must be done by codifying
the right.  This is the only way to guarantee that jurors are
informed of their power.  Furthermore, because judges and
even prosecutors can misinterpret legislative intention,134 leg-
islators need to be explicit about their desire to protect the
power of jury nullification.  The best compromise between judi-
131 See Fairfax, supra note 61, at 1252–58. R
132 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 59–61 (2012) (“Despite the fact
that most drug arrests are for nonviolent minor offenses, the War on Drugs has
ushered in an era of unprecedented punitiveness.”); MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING
RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 54 (2012) (“Racial disparities are a product
of how the drug wars have been fought.”); Drug Policy Alliance, The Drug War,
Mass Incarceration and Race (Feb. 2016), https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/de
fault/files/DPA%20Fact%20Sheet_Drug%20War%20Mass%20Incarceration%20
and%20Race_(Feb.%202016).pdf [https://perma.cc/5WQC-6GJL] (presenting
statistics which show the disproportionate effects of the drug war).
133 See Carroll, supra note 2, at 622; Goode, supra note 60 (reporting that 97% R
of federal criminal cases are decided through plea bargain, thus excluding juries
from the process).
134 See Carroll, supra note 2, at 617–20. R
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cial disapproval and legislative intent would be for legislators to
unambiguously codify the right to a nullification defense
presented by the defense counsel.  This would allow attorneys
to vigorously present the defense of nullification at their own
discretion.  Defense counsel could present evidence relating to
the topic of nullification when relevant and applicable to the
facts of the case.135  This would still allow the topic of nullifica-
tion into the courtroom, but with some judicial supervision
over what evidence is admissible and without compromising
judicial values by requiring the judge to instruct the jury to
ignore the law.  Instead, the defense counsel would have to
make a compelling argument to the jury that the defendant is
an exception worthy of nullification.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part II, no traditional system
for codifying the right to jury nullification fully protects the
integrity of moral appeals to a “higher law” or the requirement
of publicity in order to achieve legislative change.  Even in the
system discussed above, juries may still feel the need to keep
the reasons for their decision secretive.  For this reason,
lawmakers that wish to protect the democratic function of the
jury need to be innovative.  Lawmakers should work together to
create a new system that will empower the jury and invigorate
the voice of the community within the court system.  One pos-
sible innovative change would be to create a system in which a
defendant has the option to use a formal nullification defense
by entering a “nullification plea” during the pre-trial pleading
stage.  If the defendant chooses to make a nullification plea, the
defendant would essentially plead guilty but argue that the law
itself is being unjustly applied and the defendant should be
excused from punishment.  A jury would then be selected using
traditional methods and instructed that they can either find
that the law should be applied in this defendant’s case or find
that the law is unjust.  Attorneys would have the responsibility
to present the facts of the case, give mitigating or aggravating
evidence, and discuss the larger, systemic impact of the law.  If
the jury finds that the law should be applied, the defendant
would be found guilty automatically.  If the jury finds that the
law should not be applied, the defendant would be acquitted.
In either scenario, the defendant would still be in jeopardy of
civil liability for any damages that occurred from his actions.
135 See Monroe H. Freedman, Jury Nullification: What it is, and How to do it
Ethically, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1135–37 (2014) (discussing how to present a
nullification defense during closing arguments and providing a thorough history
of nullification).
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This nullification plea option could only be used by defend-
ants who are willing to admit the facts of the case and that they
broke the law.  In exchange for the possibility that the jury will
choose to nullify the law, the defendant is willing to suffer the
consequences if the jury decides that the law is valid.  The
greatest benefit of introducing this radical system would be
forcing jury nullification into a more public sphere.  Here, the
reasoning behind the jury’s acquittal would not be secretive.
The process is public, and therefore has the best chance of
making real judicial and legislative changes that will impact
the entire community—not just one defendant who is on trial.
The public process would require more legislative accountabil-
ity for the laws that juries repeatedly ignore.  Additionally, if a
jury acts against community standards by failing to convict a
defendant after a nullification plea, this process will allow for
more opportunity for community backlash and discussion than
traditional, private jury nullification.  Through this process of
nullification pleas, jury nullification can be used to create pre-
dictability and transparency when the formal constructs of law
are not consistent with citizens’ expectations.136  Furthermore,
a nullification plea allows for community involvement and de-
mocracy to be introduced into the plea system, a realm in
which the jury is traditionally unable to perform its function of
preventing government overreach.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the power of the jury to prevent government
overreach is too important to lose, and jury nullification has
always been an integral way for juries to invoke the voice of the
community in the criminal justice system.  Jury nullification
both protects individuals unfairly targeted by the system and
draws attention to laws that violate community standards.
Elected legislators, who have vowed to represent the voice of
the people, should be motivated to uphold this system, even if
the judiciary, who have vowed to uphold the law, is resistant.
As seen through the lens of the recent attempts to codify jury
nullification in New Hampshire,137 legislators must be both
creative and direct in order to resist latent disapproval, espe-
136 See Carroll, supra note 2, at 622 (arguing that nullification is a challenge to R
the notion that law requires wholesale deference).  This system also facilitates full
civil disobedience of the defendant, acting in conjunction with the jury as its
agent: an illegal act performed with a willingness to suffer the penalty for its
performance is publicly, conscientiously, and non-violently pardoned. See supra
notes 21–24 and accompanying text. R
137 See supra subpart II.D.
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cially from the judicial branch.  Whether this is done by requir-
ing judicial instructions, allowing mitigating evidence related to
nullification, or implementing an innovative system of nullifica-
tion pleas, the agentic legislatures should take it upon them-
selves to codify the right to jury nullification.
